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Cybersecurity

Every breach post-mortem ends at your program.

A FalseGreen Job verifies the exact program you ship — code, pinned dependencies, secrets, supply chain — against a frozen contract.

The problem

The breach path runs through your code and your dependencies.

Exploited vulnerabilities

Vulnerability exploitation is the most common way into a breach — 31% of breaches in 2026, up from 20% the year before.

The patch was there. Nobody deployed it.

Equifax cost $1.4B — a disclosed fix that never reached the software running in production.

Your dependencies ship too

Supply-chain compromise is the #2-cost breach vector — $4.91M per incident, 267 days to identify and contain. The payload rides in packages you already trust.

Sources: Verizon DBIR 2026 and IBM 2026 via Secureframe · IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2025

The record

The supply chain is a risk and a running campaign.

Sep 8, 2025 — chalk / debug hijacked on npm

One phished maintainer account poisoned 18 packages with 2.6 billion weekly downloads. Credential- and key-stealing code rode into builds for hours.

Source: Upwind 2025

Nov 2025 — Shai-Hulud, the first npm worm

A self-propagating worm compromised 492 packages and drew a public CISA alert. Credential theft on developer machines, at registry scale.

Source: Palo Alto Unit 42 2025

Aug 20, 2026 — crates.io: arrayref hijacked

A maintainer account was compromised and a typosquatted proc-macro carrying a build-time dropper entered 245 million downloads of Rust — reverse-deps include blake3 and winit. Cargo still has no publish-age or install-script control.

Source: Wiz 2026

Sep–Oct 2026 — CHAINDROP worm, 400+ npm packages

A compromised keyv maintainer cascaded through co-owned packages totalling 1.3 billion monthly downloads. One malicious release shipped with a valid provenance attestation.

Source: Elastic Security Labs 2026

Oct 21, 2026 — PHP2Shell

CVSS 9.2 unauthenticated RCE in the PHP engine — roughly 70% of websites. Attackers were probing before disclosure; government sites went dark to patch. The flaw was memory safety: a bug class Rust eliminates at compile time.

Source: CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619

Honest coverage

What a FalseGreen Job defends. And what it does not.

Vulnerabilities in your code

Exploited vulnerabilities are now the #1 initial-access vector in breaches — 31%, up from 20%. A FalseGreen Job decides your criteria, invariants, and proofs on the exact bytes you ship.

Known-bad dependencies

The security lane checks every pinned dependency against OSV advisories — vulnerable only if your exact pinned version falls inside the affected range — plus SBOM, secret scanning, and SAST.

The patch-to-ship gap

Every FalseGreen Job re-runs the security lane against live advisories — and the Gate makes that verdict a CI requirement. A pinned dependency with a known advisory fails the next Job, and the pull request carrying it is blocked until it is fixed.

The answer after the headlines

"Were we exposed to PHP2Shell / CHAINDROP at release?" The report names the whole verified dependency graph and can be re-checked offline by anyone — a minutes answer, not a war room.

Phishing and the human layer

Phishing is the most common initial vector in breaches (16%). No software verification tool stops it. We don't claim to.

Keys and privileged access

Stolen keys and privileged accounts cause some of the largest losses in security incidents. That is hardware, custody, and identity tooling — not program verification.

Day-one payloads with no advisory

A brand-new malicious crate is caught only once an advisory exists. FalseGreen checks the known graph; no scanner does more and says so.

Sources: Verizon DBIR 2026 / IBM 2026 via Secureframe

The math

$4.91M

average supply-chain compromise — the #2-cost breach vector

$1.4B

Equifax: a disclosed patch that never reached production

$2,999

one FalseGreen Job per release — plus the Gate check on every pull request, free

Sources: IBM 2025 · NotPetya & Equifax retrospectives

Every figure, sourced →

One FalseGreen Job, security lane

Release candidate — your code + exact pinned dependency graph
↓ security checks
OSV-confirmed SCA · SBOM · secret scanning · SAST · supply chain
↓ verdict
Accepted — report names every component checked
↓ gate
Gate enforces that verdict on every pull request, free

See how the FalseGreen Job works →

Requirements in. Verified Rust out.